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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1594 
___________ 
 
OFFICE DEPOT, INC.; 
NORTH AMERICAN CARD AND COUPON SERVICES, LLC, 
  Appellants 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF FINANCE FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE; 
STATE ESCHEATOR OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE;  
AUDIT MANAGER FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
___________________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civ. No. 1-16-cv-00609) 
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
___________________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)* 
on September 27, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and CONTI, Chief District Judge.** 
 
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2018) 
                                              
* The case was held in abeyance pending this Court’s decision in Marathon 
Petroleum Corp. v. Secretary of Finance, 876 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017). 
** Honorable Joy Flowers Conti, Chief Judge of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION*** 
____________ 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
In this case we are asked to decide whether Delaware may conduct an audit 
examining whether monies paid for stored-value gift cards issued by a Delaware 
company’s out-of-state subsidiary are held by the parent company and thus subject to 
escheat, or whether such an audit is preempted by the federal common law governing 
escheat.  Appellants are Office Depot, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a principal place 
of business in Florida, and North American Card and Coupon Services, LLC (NACCS), 
Office Depot’s special-purpose subsidiary organized in Virginia.   
In all material respects, this case is identical to Marathon Petroleum Corp. v. 
Secretary of Finance, 876 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017)—which we decided after the District 
Court issued its opinion in this case—and compels the same result.  Like the appellants in 
Marathon, Office Depot and NACCS contend that the District Court erred in (1) ruling 
that private parties lack standing to invoke the federal common law to challenge a state’s 
authority to escheat property, and (2) dismissing Appellants’ claim that the Texas 
trilogy—a set of cases in which the Supreme Court set out the rules of priority governing 
the escheat of intangible property—preempted Delaware’s audit of NACCS’s gift cards.  
                                              
*** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 
(1972); Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 (1993).1 
Appellants are correct that, as we indicated in New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass’n 
v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2012), and recently squarely held in 
Marathon, 876 F.3d at 493, private parties have standing to challenge a state’s authority 
to conduct an audit and escheat abandoned property.  However, as we explained at length 
in Marathon, the Texas cases do not prevent Delaware from initiating an inquiry to 
determine the true holder of abandoned property.  Id. at 499.  The Supreme Court has 
observed that the first step in assessing a state’s right to escheat intangible personal 
property is “determin[ing] the precise debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the law 
that creates the property at issue,” Delaware, 507 U.S. at 499, and Delaware may seek 
information that will assist it in making that determination, Marathon, 876 F.3d at 499.  
“We do not read the Texas trilogy as foreclosing a state’s right to conduct an appropriate 
examination to determine if there is fraud or another basis for determining that property 
may be escheated, even if a contract viewed in isolation might suggest otherwise.”  Id. at 
501.  Therefore, we must reject Appellants’ claim. 
That said, we emphasized in Marathon that our resolution of the narrow issue of 
whether Delaware may conduct an audit does not bar private parties from bringing suit to 
                                              
1 Just as in Marathon, here Delaware contends that Appellants’ preemption claim 
is not ripe.  But the claim is ripe insofar as Appellants are challenging Delaware’s 
authority to initiate the audit at all; it is not ripe to the extent they are challenging the 
scope or means of the examination because “Delaware has as yet taken no formal steps to 
compel cooperation with its audit,” Marathon, 876 F.3d at 497 n.18. 
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challenge the audit if and when the state’s demands for information become “so 
obviously pretextual or insatiable . . . that ‘it is evident that the result of [the] process 
must lead to conflict preemption.’”  Id. (quoting NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG 
Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2001)).  An audit process that extends 
beyond a legitimate inquiry into whether a subsidiary company is bona fide may well 
trigger the priority rules.  Although no such argument is available where, as here, the 
state has not initiated an enforcement proceeding, it is possible that Appellants will have 
a viable claim as to the scope of the audit at a future date.2 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand 
with instructions to dismiss Office Depot and NACCS’s preemption claim without 
prejudice. 
                                              
2 Appellants allege that, in light of their failure to provide requested documents, 
the third-party auditor employed by Delaware, Kelmar, notified them that it had referred 
the matter to the Attorney General’s office for consideration of enforcement action, 
whereas in Marathon the subsidiaries alleged only that Kelmar had threatened to refer the 
matter.  This factual distinction is not material, however, because in neither case has the 
state formally sought compliance. 
